THE DUTY OF CALIFORNIA COUNTIES TO
PROVIDE MENTAL HEALTH CARE FOR THE
INDIGENT AND HOMELESS

The increasingnumber of homeless and indigent mentally ill poses
difficult issues for courts, legislatures, and local governments.
California has failed to recognize a constitutional or statutory
right to community or mental health treatment. This Comment
advocates that, as a starting point, counties in California have a
statutory duty under the Welfare and Institutions Code to provide
aid to the homeless and indigent.
INTRODUCTION

This Comment concerns the homeless and indigent mentally ill:
the street people many of us see when walking to our downtown offices. Of Los Angeles' estimated 50,000 homeless, one-third "might
be termed severely and chronically mentally ill." 1
Nationwide, estimates of the total homeless range from a conservative 250,000 to 300,000 estimated by the United States Depart-

ment of Housing and Urban Development,' to between two and
three million estimated by the Community for Creative Non-Violence.3 Although practical problems exist in counting the homeless,4
1. 1986 Los ANGELES COUNTY STUDY OF HOMELESSNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS
IN THE SKID Row AREA OF Los ANGELES, cited in Goldin, Gimme Shelter, CAL. LAW.,
May 1987, at 30-31.
2. A disproportionate number of the homeless are thought to live in the western
half of the country. U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. & URBAN DEv., A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY
ON THE HOMELESS AND EMERGENCY SHELTERS 18-19 (1984).

3. Frazier, Responding to the Needs of the Homeless Mentally Ill, PUB.
HEALTH REP., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 464 (citing M. HOMBS & M. SNYDER, COMMUNITY
FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A FORCED MARCH TO NOWHERE (1982)).

4. The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) filed suit in 1984 challenging HUD's estimate of 250,000 to 350,000 homeless, fearing that a 7Y ths reduction in
the working estimate of the number of homeless would mislead legislators and private
benefactors and lead to a reduction in benefits. CCNV contacted various shelter providers in large cities to verify HUD's estimates of homeless, and found wide discrepancies.
For example, 16,300 homeless were sheltered on any given night in New York (which
would make this the absolute minimum number of homeless), yet HUD estimated the

there is no doubt that the number has increased dramatically since

the 1970 United States Census set the number of homeless at 20,957
across the nation.5 It has been estimated that 33% to 50% of the
6
approximate two million homeless are chronically mentally ill.
This Comment discusses the causes of homelessness and suggests
what should be done to meet the needs of the homeless mentally ill.
Further, this Comment describes efforts to establish a constitutional
right to treatment in the least restrictive setting and California's rejection of a constitutional or statutory right to such treatment. Finally, this Comment concludes that California counties have a duty
to provide mental health care for indigents based on state welfare
laws.
THE CAUSES OF HOMELESSNESS

Hundreds of thousands of mentally ill people live on the streets.
Most experts blame this phenomenon on three decades of massive
deinstitutionalization, during which the majority of patients were
discharged from mental hospitals.'
The massive depopulation of mental hospitals8 was seen as a more
humane way to deal with the mentally ill. The advent of psychoactive drugs9 and the increasing costs of institutional care10 made moving many patients into the community an attractive proposition. Adlow end of the range at 12,000. The district court dismissed CCNV's action with
prejudice, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the report was not "a final

agency action" that was judicially reviewable. Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Pierce, Civ. Action No. 84-1898 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 1984). CCVN's motion to disqualify
the United States Attorney's Office as counsel for the appellees was denied. Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1986). On the merit appeal, the court affirmed that plaintiffs lacked standing. 814 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See also Werner, Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1255,
1265-66 (1985); Werner, On the Streets: Homelessness: Causes & Solutions, 18
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 11 (1984) [hereinafter Werner, On the Streets].

5. Nelson v. Board of Supervisors, 190 Cal. App. 3d 25, 33 n.4, 235 Cal. Rptr.
305, 310 n.4 (1987) (citing CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV., A
STUDY OF THE ISSUES & CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOMELESS POPULATION IN CAL. 1, 8

(Apr. 1985).
6. See Werner, On the Streets, supra note 4, at 13 (citing Homelessness in
America: Hearing before the House Subcomm. on Hous. & Community Dev., 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings]). See also Note, Building a House of
Legal Rights: A Plea for the Homeless, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 530, 556 n.141 (1985)
(the number of homeless mentally ill is estimated to be 20 to 50 percent of the total
homeless population).
7. See Collin, Homelessness: The Policy and the Law, 16 URB. LAW. 317, 31823 (1984); Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,Homelessness, & Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375 (1982); Note, supra note 6, at 530.
8. The number of patients in mental hospitals decreased from 559,000 in 1955
to 171,000 in 1976. See Rhoden, supra note 7, at 378.
9. See id. at 378-80. See also Lamb, Deinstitutionalizationand the Homeless
Mentally Ill,
35 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 899, 902 (1984).
10. See Rhoden, supra note 7, at 381-82; Lamb, supra note 9, at 902.
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ditionally, after expos6s revealed that mental hospitals "were vast
dehumanizing warehouses whose neglected, ill-fed, and abused inmates could, with little exaggeration, be counted among the living
dead,"" reformers sought release of patients into the community,
be12
lieving treatment in the community would be more effective.
Another powerful motivating force behind deinstitutionalization
was the belief that patients' civil rights were being violated by institutional treatment and methods of commitment. 13 In the 1960s and
1970s, patient advocates began to challenge some practices of the
mental health system.4 Lawsuits were brought to enforce patients'
"right to treatment,"' arguing that taking away a patient's liberty
for the purpose of treatment without subsequently providing treatment, was a violation of a patient's right to due process.'
The first right to treatment suits were habeas corpus actions which
sought alternative types of treatment or release for individual patients.' 6 Later suits were framed as class actions challenging
the
17
quality of care and conditions within the institutions.
One health professional, Dr. Richard Lamb, blames patients'
rights advocates for contributing to the problem of homelessness. Dr.
11.

Rhoden, supra note 7, at 380.
12. Id. Psychological and sociological studies showed that institutionalization
made the patients dependent and passive and contributed to the pathology it was meant
to cure. See also Werner, On the Streets, supra note 4, at 13; Lamb, supra note 9, at
901-02.
13. See Lamb, supra note 9, at 902; Werner, On the Streets, supra note 4, at 13.
14. This right was first advanced by Morton Birnbaum in 1960. Birnbaum viewed
intitutionalization in mental health facilities without treatment as tantamount to criminal
incarceration. He reasoned: "[1]f repeated court decisions constantly remind the public
that medical care in public institutions is inadequate, not only will the mentally ill be
released from their mental prisons, but, it is believed that public opinion will react to
force the legislature to increase appropriations to make it possible to provide adequate
care and treatment so that the mentally ill will be treated in mental hospitals." Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499, 503 (1960). Birnbaum's article is
considered the seminal work on the right to treatment for the mentally ill.
15. See Donaldson v. O'Conner, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir. 1974) (there must
be a rational relationship between the purpose for which a patient was confined and the
nature and duration of treatment); see also Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 105 (2d Cir.
1984) (if the basis for involuntary commitment to a mental institution is even partially
dependent upon a patient's need for care and treatment under state law, then the committing state must also treat). See generally Birnbaum, supra note 14, at 503.
16. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (right to
treatment found to exist based on District of Columbia statute, although dictum in the
opinion suggests the possibility of a constitutional basis for a right to treatment).
17. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced,
334 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Ala. 1971), orders entered, 344 F. Supp. 373 & 344 F. Supp. 387
(D. Ala. 1972), remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974) (institutionalized mentally ill have a right to treatment).

Lamb argues that "patients' rights to freedom are not synonymous
with releasing them to the streets where they cannot take care of
themselves, are too disorganized or fearful to avail themselves of
what help is available, and are easy prey for every predator."18
Others question whether deinstitutionalization was successful. According to one writer:
[Deinstitutionalization] has meant a nightmare existence in the blighted
centers of our cities, amidst neighborhoods crowded with prostitutes, exfelons, addicts, alcoholics, and other human rejects now repressively tolerated by our society. Here they eke out a precarious existence, supported by

welfare checks they may not even know how to cash. They spend their9days
locked in or out of dilapidated "community-based" boarding houses.

For some of the deinstitutionalized mentally ill it is even worse. After they are released, many of the mentally ill find themselves
stripped of virtually all resources. Often they are left without the
most basic requirements, such as food, housing, income, or social or
family support. Although many are eligible for benefits, they cannot
apply because they are incompetent. At times, their perceptions of
reality are so distorted that they will refuse food or shelter.20
The results are often tragic, because the homeless mentally ill are
vulnerable targets for crime who die in disproportionately high numbers." Painful examples occur, such as a "mentally ill Vassar graduate who lived at Union Station in Washington [who] was not committed because she was not dangerous, and was soon found brutally
stabbed near her 'home.'"22

Deinstitutionalization failed because adequate community facilities were not, and still have not, been created. 23 The American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Task Force on the Homeless Mentally
Ill blames the method of deinstitutionalization for the high numbers
of homeless mentally ill. The Task Force found that deinstitutinalization had emptied mental hospitals of three fourths of their inpatient population and had left approximately one million people "cast
adrift under circumstances that most persons think no longer exist in
this country. 2 4
APA Task Force Chairman Dr. Richard Lamb blames the failure
of deinstitutionalization on a lack of planning for such fundamental
18.
19.

Lamb, supra note 9, at 902.
A. SCHULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT & THE DEVIANT: A
RADICAL VIEW 2 (1979).
20. Hearings,supra note 6, at 553-54. See also Rhoden, supra note 7, at 391-92.
21. See Rhoden, supra note 7, at 391-92; Collin, supra note 7, at 321-22; see also
Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Mental Health Ass'n of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal.
App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1986) (citing trial testimony) [hereinafter Opening

Brief].
22. Rhoden, supra note 7, at 392.
23. See Lamb, supra note 9, at 890.
24. Id.
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resources as structured living arrangements and adequate treatment
and rehabilitative facilities in the community. Resistance of community mental health centers to provide the mentally ill with services
was not anticipated, nor was the reluctance of many states to allocate funds for community-based services.2 5
A United States General Accounting Office Report (GAO Report) found that instead of successful deinstitutionalization with
well-funded community programs, we are left with "seriously flawed
institutional and community programs competing for dwindling resources, while the demand for those resources steadily increases as
more people seek care." 6
Other experts argue that deinstitutionalization was not an articulated goal in the beginning; therefore, there was no need to plan in
advance for adequate facilities upon release. Further, "[e]ven after
it became a policy of the government, health planners and politicians

frequently assumed that when patients were released from state hospitals, communities would develop alternatives. However, local officials simultaneously assumed that federal social welfare programs
would provide sufficient care for the former patients."2 8
Another reason named for the failure of deinstitutionalization is
the lack of a central "delivery system" of services for the mentally
ill. Services are rarely provided in any organized, systematic manner.
Patients are often lost in the bureaucratic shuffle, because they are
unable to negotiate the necessary steps to apply for and receive aid
and services which they need.29 The GAO Report recognized the
lack of organized support services available to the mentally ill, calling the existing services, at best, a group functionally related by
loosely linked subsystems.30
ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL

Some experts argue that reinstitutionalizing the mentally ill will
solve the problems of homelessness and lack of care. 3 1 Many profes25. Id. at 890-91.
26.

S. BRAKEL,

J. PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, RETURNING THE MENTALLY

615 (3d ed. 1985) (citing

DISABLED TO THE COMMUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO Do MORE (1977) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]).

27.

See Rhoden, supra note 7, at 392.

28. Id. at 392-93.
29.

Id. at 393; Lamb, supra note 9, at 900.

30. See GAO
31.

REPORT,

supra note 26, at 8.

See Borus, Deinstitutionalizationof the Chronically Mentally Il, 305 NEw
ENG. J. OF MED. 339 (1981); Feldman, Out of the Hospital, Onto the Streets: The Over-

sionals reject this argument believing that those who support reinstitutionalization exaggerate the care patients are said to have received
while institutionalized. Opponents of reinstitutionalization cite the
reasons which prompted deinstitutionalization in the first place: loss
of freedom, inadequate and restrictive care, and abuse and neglect
by staff.32
The APA Task Force on the Homeless Mentally Ill suggests that
the ultimate goal is to have a case manager responsible for each
chronically mentally ill person in the county. This manager would
guide the mentally ill individual through the maze of mental health
services, including financial aid and rehabilitative and residential
33
care.
The APA Task Force Report cites the need for an adequate number of graded, supervised community housing settings. Most chronically mentally ill persons cannot manage to live by themselves, and
therefore need various levels of supervision in a housing setting. The
APA Task Force suggests settings offering different levels of supervision, including quarterway and halfway houses, board-and-care
homes, foster care and crisis or temporary hostels.34
Another important need is for "[a]dequate, comprehensive, and
accessible psychiatric and rehabilitative services . . . [which] must

be assertively provided through outreach services when necessary." 35
The APA Task Force advocates direct psychiatric services in the
shelters and on the streets to provide outreach contact with the mentally ill in the community. Services available should include: psychiatric assessment and evaluation, crisis intervention, individualized
treatment plans, and psychotropic medication.36
Further, the APA Task Force advocates treatment and rehabilita-

tive services "provided assertively" by seeking out the person who
might need help, if the person cannot come to the facility. The need
for rehabilitative services, such as training in skills needed for everyday living, is emphasized in order to make the mentally disabled person as self-sufficient as possible.3 7 Finally, the APA Task Force calls

for "[n]ew laws and procedures . . . to ensure provision of psychiatric care in the community . . . to guarantee a right to treatment in
selling of Benevolence, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 7 (1983).
32. See Lamb, supra note 9, at 904. See generally supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
33. Recommendations of APA's Task Force on the Homeless Mentally Ill, 35
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 908 (1984) [hereinafter Recommendations of APA].
The Report of the Task Force was presented to Congress in September of 1984. See 130
CONG. REC. E3859 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1984).
34. Recommendations of APA, supra note 33, at 908. See also Rhoden, supra
note 7, at 420.
35. Recommendations of APA, supra note 33, at 908.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the community.

38

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Advocates of mental health care treatment first argued for a right
to treatment, and later, for a right to treatment in the least restrictive setting or in the community.3 9 The first decision clearly recognizing a constitutionally based right to treatment for involuntarily
committed patients was Wyatt v. Stickney,40 a 1971 decision of the
federal district court in Alabama.
Wyatt was a class action suit challenging conditions within Alabama's mental institutions. The court held that when a patient is
committed for the purpose of treatment, the patient has a "constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of
them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her
mental condition .
*."..,"
The court pointed out that the purpose of
civil commitment was treatment, not punishment, and that treatment was the only justification, from a constitutional standpoint,
that allowed civil commitment.' 2 Wyatt did not, however, articulate
a specific constitutional theory upon which this right was based.
In 1974, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically set forth a
constitutional basis for a right to treatment. The court in Donaldson
v. O'Connor43 set forth a two-part theory upon which this right was
based, premised upon the notion that involuntary commitment without treatment violates substantive due process."
The first part of the theory applies to those patients committed
under a state's parenspatriae authority. Parenspatriaegives a state
38. Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
39. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. See generally Rapson, The
Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the Community, 16 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 193 (1980); Comment, The ConstitutionalRight to Treatment Services for
the Noncommitted Mentally Disabled, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 675 (1980). Some commentators argue for a constitutional right to mental health care and health care in general. See
generally Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) (advocating "welfare" rights as constitutional rights). But see Blackstone, On Health Care as a Legal Right: An Exploration
of Legal & Moral Grounds, 10 GA. L. REV. 391 (1976) (arguing that a right to health
care involves a distortion of constitutional doctrines although health care is a human and
moral right); Carey, A ConstitutionalRight to Health Care: An Unlikely Development,
23 CATH. U.L. REV. 492 (1974).
40. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd in part, remanded in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. Id. at 785.
42. Id. at 784.
43. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
44. Id.

the right to commit an individual who, although not dangerous to
others, is in need of care or treatment.45 The court held that nontreatment of an involuntarily committed, non-dangerous individual
violated substantive due process.4
The second part of the theory is called the quid pro quo theory. It
is based upon the premise that any involuntary commitment is a curtailment of liberty similar to criminal incarceration, and therefore a
state must justify depriving a person of his liberty by giving him
something in return - treatment for his mental illness.4 Similarly,
the Third Circuit held in Clark v. Cohen48 that individuals who are
involuntarily committed "must be provided with the means to end
their commitment, otherwise civil commitment would be equivalent
to placement in 'a penitentiary.' "49 In 1975 the Supreme Court
heard Donaldson and backed away from the Fifth Circuit's finding
of a constitutional right to treatment.50 While the Court unanimously agreed that Donaldson should have been released,' it
pointed out in a footnote that the issue before it was not the right to

treatment 5or
the adequacy of treatment, but rather the propriety of
2
treatment.

Further, Chief Justice Burger devoted ten pages of his twelve-page
concurrence to the proposition that the Fifth Circuit's analysis supporting a constitutional right to treatment had "no basis in the decision of this Court."5 3 Consequently, the constitutional right to treat-

ment set forth by the court of appeals appeared to suffer an early
54
death.

The Supreme Court, since deciding Donaldson, has recognized a

45. Id. at 521.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 521-23.
48. 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986).
49. Id. at 94.
50. See 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
51. Id. at 576.
52. Id. at 574 n.10. In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Court found the lower
court's decision needlessly broad and remanded for a finding of defendant Florida State
Hospital Director's liability in light of the qualified immunity of state officials under 28
U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 573, 577.
53. Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
54. See generally Baldwin, O'Connor v. Donaldson: Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment, 7 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 573, 589 (1975). For
commentary following the Supreme Court's Donaldson decision, see Kopolow, A Review
of Major Implications of the O'Connor v. Donaldson Decision, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
379 (1976); Note, "Without More". A ConstitutionalRight To Treatment?, 22 Loy. L.
REv. 373 (1975-76); Note, The Right to Treatment Case - That Wasn't, 30 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 486 (1976); Lottman, Whatever Happened to Kenneth Donaldson?, I MENTAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 288 (1977); Spece, Preservingthe Right to Treatment: A Critical
Assessment and Constructive Development of ConstitutionalRight to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1978).
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limited right to habilitation for the mentally retarded.5 5 In
Youngberg v. Romeo56 the Supreme Court based the right to habilitation on the liberty component of the fourteenth amendment's due

process right, which requires the "[s]tate to provide minimally adequate or reasonable
training to ensure safety and freedom from un'57
due restraint.
The Court explained that due process is satisfied if restraints on
freedom are based on the judgment of qualified professionals.58 Some

federal courts have mandated patient placement in a less restrictive
environment when the professionals treating the patient have recom-

mended such action. 59 However, in instances where maintaining patients in an institution is not a substantial departure from the usual
judgment of professionals in similar situations, courts have not recognized60a constitutional right to treatment in the least restrictive

setting.

Post-Youngberg decisions have expanded its scope, which recognized restraints based on the judgment of qualified professionals. In
1984, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no

right to community placement for mentally retarded individuals.6"
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's order to move 400
mentally retarded residents into community placement facilities because their placement in institutions was depriving them of their basic liberties.6 2 The appellate court focused on the Youngberg decision
and reasoned that the question before it was "'not what treatment

was actually provided, but whether the treatment decision was professionally made and [fell] within the scope of professional
55.
while the
56.
57.

58.

Generally, the law speaks of the "right to treatment" for the mentally ill,
common phrase for the retarded is the "right to habilitation."
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Id at 319. See generally Brakel, supra note 26, at 337-40.

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-323 (citations omitted).

59. See, e.g., Thomas v. Murrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1986) (approving the
district court's order to place the patient in the community when the professional in
charge of his care recommended such action).
60. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239,
1247-48 (2d Cir. 1984). The court explained that the focus should be on whether a patient's "basic" liberty interests are being safeguarded, not whether the optimal course of
treatment, as decided by experts in the field, is followed. Id. at 1248. In this case, the
appeals court held that there was no constitutional entitlement to community placement
or placement in the least restrictive environment, overruling the district court's decision
that mentally retarded persons have a constitutional right to treatment in an environment
which would assist them in preserving basic self-care skills. See also infra notes 63-67
and accompanying text.
61. See Soc'y for Good Will, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).

62. See generally id.

acceptability.' "63

In California, the appellate court in Mental Health Association v.

Deukmejian6 4 held that there is no state constitutional right to com-

munity health treatment or mental health treatment in a least restrictive environment. 65 The law in this area is still uncertain because
the California Supreme Court subsequently decertified the opinion
for official publication. In Mental Health Association, the plaintiffs
sought the creation of a state and county fund for the implementation of a community-based, mental health residential and rehabilitative program for gravely mentally disabled persons within Los Angeles County. 6 Plaintiffs sought to aid the "revolving door"
population, 7 defined as "those who are released to the community
without adequate support but are 'disabled enough' to suffer frequent and repeated loss of liberty by hospitalization, but 'not disabled enough' to be given continuing and appropriate follow-up care
once they are released to the community." '

No RIGHT To COMMUNITY HEALTH TREATMENT BASED UPON
STATE MENTAL HEALTH STATUTES

In Mental Health Association v. Deukmejian, the plaintiffs also
argued that the statutory scheme comprised of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS),69 Community Residential Treatment Act
63. Id. at 1249 (emphasis added). See also Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365,
368 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding no constitutional right to community placement, or more
generally, no constitutional right to treatment in the least restrictive environment).
64. 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1986), modified, 187 Cal. App.
3d 212a (1986), review denied and decertified for publication.
65. Id.
66. 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130.
67. The series of events making up the "revolving door" phenomenon is described
as follows:
[C]hronicailly mentally ill persons (a) are confined at the state hospitals longer
than necessary because of a lack of appropriate placements in the community,
(b) when experiencing an acute episode are referred to a state hospital instead
of given appropriate crisis intervention and support services in the community,
(c) are eventually discharged without appropriate aftercare and support programs to help them maintain themselves in the community, and, (d) predictably, return to the hospital unnecessarily when they "decompensate."
Opening Brief, supra note 21, at 5 (Finding 29).
68. Mental Health Ass'n, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1536 n.3, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 132
n.3.
69. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5579 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter LPS]. The Welfare and Institutions Code is comprised of separate divisions dealing

with mental health and welfare assistance for the needy. Division Five is entitled "Community Mental Health Services," and includes the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, the
Community Residential Treatment Act, and the Short-Doyle Act. Division Nine, entitled
"Public Social Services," includes a section entitled "County Aid and Relief to Indigents" which contains what is commonly referred to as "welfare laws" for the indigent.
The LPS was enacted to end inappropriate involuntary commitment of the mentally
disabled and to protect the safety of both the public and the mentally disabled.
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(CRT),7 0 and Short-Doyle Act (Short-Doyle) 71 mandated a full con-

tinuum of services72including least restrictive treatment in a community-based setting.

The trial court found that "[a]s a result of the lack of a full continuum of programs and services,

. . .

gravely disabled persons...

in Los Angeles County are frequently subjected to the 'revolving
door' process."7 3 It held, however, that the state had no duty to pro-

vide community-based mental health services. 4
The appellate court affirmed, holding that no statutory right to
community-based treatment exists under the LPS, CRT or Short-

Doyle.75 Instead, as the trial court had found, the statutory scheme
created a "preference for mental health treatment in the least re'7 6
strictive environment but did not create an absolute right to it."
The lack of legislative funding for a mandatory community program
was considered proof that the legislature did not intend to mandate

community treatment.
Both the trial court and appellate court classified the statutory
language as permissive, rather than mandatory.78 The appellate
70. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5450-66 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter CRT]. The CRT was enacted to establish residential treatment programs in each
county to provide alternatives to institutionalized care and was designed to provide community-based residential treatment.
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5600-5778 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter Short-Doyle]. Short-Doyle is the funding mechanism for community mental health
services as provided by the LPS as amended by the CRT.
72. Mental Health Ass'n, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1540, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
Expert testimony at trial defined a full continuum of services including: "[A]ppropriate
long-term hospitalization, 24-hour acute intensive care, short-term crisis residential care,
out of home placement, emergency service and evaluation, acute day treatment, outpatient services, case management, community support services, community outreach services, mental health advocacy and foster family care." Id. at 1540 n.4, 233 Cal. Rptr. at
134 n.4.
73. Opening Brief, supra note 21, at 4.
74. Mental Health Ass'n, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
75. Id. at 1540, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
76. Id. at 1540, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1540, 1542, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5450.1 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987), which states in part: "To this end, counties may
implement the community residential treatment system described in this chapter either
with available county allocations or, as new moneys become available, by applying for
funds to the State Department of Mental Health.") (emphasis original).
78. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5325 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987), which provides in part: "It is the intent of the
Legislature that persons with mental illness shall have rights including, but not limited
to, the following: (a) A right to treatment services which promote the potential of the
person to function independently. Treatment should be provided in ways that are least
restrictive of the personal liberty of the individual.") (emphasis original).

court pointed out language which evidenced the legislature's intent
to promote, rather than mandate, a community-based mental health
system.79 Lastly, the appellate court stated that its holding encompassed the committed mentally ill population as well as the "revolving door" population either in or out of the hospital at the time of
trial.8 0
Since Mental Health Association v. Deukmejian, California has
not recognized a state constitutional right to community-based
mental health treatment.8 1 Nor does such a right exist based upon
state mental health statutes.82

RIGHT TO COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT BASED
UPON STATE WELFARE STATUTES

Since establishing a state or county duty to provide mental health
treatment in the community based on California mental health laws
has failed, a duty must be established based on California welfare
laws.
In California, it is the duty of each county to provide aid to its
indigents. Section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code states:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or
accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported
own means, or by state
and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their
83
hospitals or other state or private institutions.

This aid is called General Assistance or General Relief in most
counties. The California appellate court has described it as a "program of last resort" for indigents unable to meet standards of other
relief programs.8 4
General Assistance has existed in California since 1855.85 Section
17000 is virtually identical to the 1931 amendment to the Pauper
79. Id. at 1541-42, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
5450 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987), which states in part: "It is the intent of the Legislature
to establish a system of residential treatment programs in every county which provide, in
each county, a range of available services which will be alternatives to institutional care
and are based on principles of residential, community-based treatment.").
80. Id. at 1548, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
81. The present state of the law in this area is now unclear because the California
Supreme Court has ordered the Mental Health Ass'n opinion decertified for official publication. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
82. See Mental Health Ass'n, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1540, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
83. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1984).

84. Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 499, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716,

719 (1986); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal.
3d 669, 681, 483 P.2d 1231, 1239, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 287 (1971); see generally Comment, General Assistance in California, 12 U. SAN. FERN. VALLEY L. REV. 31 (1984).
85. See Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 677, 483 P.2d at 1236, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 284 (citing
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL

(1970)).
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Act of 1901.186 The major difference is the use of the word "pauper"
in the 1931 amendment as compared to the use of the word "indigent" in section 17000.
In Mooney v. Pickett,87 the California Supreme Court held that
the Pauper Act imposed a mandatory duty on counties to provide aid
to all indigent persons. The court upheld an action by the city and
county of San Francisco to sell municipal bonds to raise money to
support indigents. In its opinion, the court stated: "[tihe statutes are
neither in terms nor spirit limited to the relief of chronic or permanent paupers, or any other class of poor persons, but extend to every
person coming within the terms of the statute dependent upon public
assistance for the necessitites of life." 88
The legislature repealed the Pauper Act in 1933 and enacted a
law mandating county aid to "all able-bodied indigent persons and
those indigents incapacitated by age, disease or accident."8 9 In 1937
the legislature enacted the Welfare and Institution Codes, including
section 17000.90
The Board of Supervisors ("Board") in each county is responsible,
in the exercise of its discretion, for setting the standards of aid and
care to be provided to indigents. 91 However, a court must override
that discretion if the county arbitrarily or capriciously sets the level
of aid.92 In Mooney, the court limited the county's discretion, stating
that it could "be exercised only within fixed boundaries," and its regulations must be adequate to provide "the means of life;"9 " therefore,
the court upheld the city of San Francisco's sale of municipal bonds

to raise money for indigent support.
In Boehm v. Merced County,94 the appellate court held that the
86. 4 Cal. 3d at 677, 483 P.2d at 1236, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 284. The Pauper Act of
1901 provided:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all pauper,
incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those incapacitated by age, disease, or
accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and
relieved by their relatives or friends, or by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions.

See 2

CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN.

87.
88.
89.
90.

91.

act 5814 (Deering 1931).

4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279.
San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Cal. 187, 190, 13 P.2d 912, 913 (1932).
1932 Cal. Stat. 761.
Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 678, 483 P.2d at 1236, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001 (West 1984).
City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44, 49,
Rptr. 712, 716 (1976).
See Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 679, 681, 483 P.2d at 1237, 1239, 94 Cal. Rptr. at

92.
128 Cal.
93.
285, 287.
94. 163 Cal. App. 3d 447, 209 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1985).

Merced County Board of Supervisors acted arbitrarily and
capricously in reducing General Assistance levels without first determining the actual cost of obtaining the basic necessities of life. 5 The
Board reduced grant levels from $198 per month for an individual to
$175 per month.
After remand, the appellate court stated: "[t]he County must set
GA [General Assistance] standards of aid and care that provide ben' The court defined minimum subefits necessary for basic survival."96
sistence, explaining that it "must include allocations for housing,
food, utilities, clothing, transportation and medical care.9 7 Further,
the court stated that it defied "all notions of human dignity not to
include allowances for clothing, transportation and medical care, and
transportation in minimum subsistence figures, adding that "such allowances are essential and necessary to 'encourage [self-respect and]
self-reliance, .
standards.' "98

.

in a "humane" manner consistent with modern

If a county does not wish to provide an allowance for any of the
basic necessities of food, clothing, housing, utilities, transportation or
medical care, it must perform a study which demonstrates the need
omitted will be provided by some other program which is available to
the General Assistance recipients. 99
The Boehm court based its decision on the legislative intent and
statutory purpose of the General Assistance program, as prescribed
in section 10000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which provides in part:
The purpose of this division is to provide for protection, care, and assistance
to the people of the state in need thereof, and to promote the welfare and
happiness of all of the people of the state by providing appropriate aid and
services to all of its needy and distressed. It is the legislative intent that aid

shall be administered and services provided promptly and humanely, with
due regard for the preservation of family life, and without discrimination

...as to encourage self-respect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a good
citizen, useful to society. 1'0

Similarly, in County of San Diego v. Muniz, 10 1 the California Supreme Court found that promoting self-sufficiency was one purpose
of General Assistance legislation. The Muniz court reached the conclusion that the county could not try to recoup past General Assistance benefits from wages per se, but only from money left over after
95. Id. at 453, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 533.

96. Boehm, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 502, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 721 (quoting Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.
3d 199, 209-210, 695 P.2d 695, 701, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398, 404 (1985)); see also CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10000, 17000 (West 1984).
99. Boehm, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 502, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
100. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10000 (West 1984).
101. 22 Cal. 3d 29, 583 P.2d 109, 140 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1978).
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the recipient met the basic needs of himself and his family. The

court based its decision on the legislative purpose in providing relief
for the needy as found in section 10000.12 Further, the Muniz court
pointed to section 10650, which indicates legislative intent to prevent

persons who could otherwise be self-supporting, productive members
of society from becoming or remaining public assistance recipients.10 3 Additionally, section 17111 indicates legislative intent that

General Assistance foster self-sufficiency among General Assistance

recipients by allowing them to retain the tools of their trades and a

car of reasonable value. 4
The Boehm court also noted section 11000, which stated at the
time of trial: "[t]he provisions of law relating to a public assistance
program shall be fairly and equitably construed to effect the stated
objects and purposes of the program."'0 5 Further, the Boehm court

recognized budgetary constraints imposed upon counties, but stated
those constraints could not justify excluding the basic necessities of
life from General Assistance aid provided for indigents. 0 6 Lack of
funds has long been recognized
as an invalid excuse for not meeting
10 7
a statutory mandate.
"Aid," as defined by the Boehm court, includes the necessities of
life: food, housing, utilities, clothing, transportation, and medical

care.1"8 Therefore, according to section 17000, counties have a duty
to meet those needs, unless they are met by some other program.
Counties, in meeting their mandatory duty to provide the necessities

of life, must provide medical care.
Medical care has been defined to include care "for the prevention
or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness."' 10 9 The Wel-

fare and Institutions Code defines the scope of health and medical
care as including:

102. Id.
103. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10650 (West 1984).
104. Id. § 17111 (West 1984).
105. Id. § I1000 (West 1984). Section I1000 was amended in 1982 to read: "The
provisions of law relating to a public assistance program shall be fairly and equitably
construed to effect the stated objects and purposes of the program." (italics indicate
amendment).
106. See Boehm, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 503, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 722; see also Robbins, 38 Cal. 3d at 217, 695 P.2d at 707, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 410; Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at
675, 483 P.2d at 1235, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
107. See Collins, 216 Cal. at 190, 13 P.2d at 913; Los Angeles v. Payne, 8 Cal. 2d
563, 573, 575 (1937); Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 676, 695 P.2d at 1235, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 283;
City and County of San Francisco,57 Cal. App. 3d at 44, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
108. See Boehm, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
109. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 885 (5th ed. 1979).

[D]iagnostic, preventive, corrective, and curative services . . . for conditions that cause suffering, endanger life, result in illness or infirmity, inter-

fere with capacity for normal activity including employment, or for conditions which may develop into some significant handicap. Medical care shall
include, but is not limited to, other remedial care, not necessarily
medical.110

Care and treatment for the mentally ill falls within the scope of
"medical care," defined above as services for conditions which
"cause suffering, endanger life . . .[and] interefere with [the] capacity for normal activity." ' Often the mentally ill go hungry and
go without adequate shelter and clothing because their debilitated
mental condition prevents them from seeking help or causes them to
refuse help when it is offered."1 The APA Task Force on the Homeless recommended many levels of structured living arrangements for
the mentally ill, because some need daily assistance with ordinary
"life" tasks such as shopping, food preparation, medication, hygiene
and socialization skills."' Further, the APA Task Force suggested
that psychiatric and rehabilitative services be aggressively offered
with professionals seeking out the needy mentally ill, because many
are unable to seek or find help. 4
MEANS BY

WHICH COUNTIES CAN DELIVER MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES

Having established the duty of California counties to provide
mental health care to indigents under section 17000, counties are
faced with choosing how to deliver mental health services. There are
essentially three options: first, services may be delivered on an inpatient basis in existing facilities; second, services may be delivered in
the community; and third, services may not be delivered to indigents
at all.
When deciding how to provide mental health services to those in
need, each county should consider the following:
1) treatment in the community is the goal of California's
mental health care system; and
2) treatment in the community is the most effective method
for the majority of the mentally ill.
Treatment in the community is the goal of California's mental
health care system, as recognized in Mental Health Association.1' "
Although treatment in the community is not mandated by California
110.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14059 (West 1984).
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
113. See Lamb, supra note 9, at 899.
114. Id.
115. 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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mental health laws, it is the preferred method of treating the mentally ill, and it is the goal of the system to eventually provide community treatment, when appropriate, to all mentally ill persons." 16
Treatment in the community is the best method of treatment for
the majority of mentally ill because it allows them to maintain as
much of their liberty as possible. 1 7 Additionally, it allows the mentally ill to avoid the loss of skills necessary to function in society
which occurs to many institutionalized patients."' It has been
proved that community treatment and support reduce the frequency
and severity of acute episodes requiring hospitalization - in even
the most seriously disturbed." 9
If a county chooses to exercise the third option, and not provide
mental health care for indigents, the courts may step in and force
compliance with the section 17000 requirement to provide all of the
necessities of life to indigents. The court has stated: "[w]hen statutes
affecting the well-being - perhaps the very survival - of citizens of
this state are being violated with impunity by the [county], an agent
of the state, the courts, as final interpreters of the law, must intervene to enforce compliance."' 20
CONCLUSION

Counties have the duty to provide aid to indigents pursuant to section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Aid, as defined by
Boehm, includes the necessities of life: housing, food, utilities, clothing, transportation and medical care.' 2 '
For the homeless or indigent mentally ill, mental health care is a
necessity of life because without such care they will continue to be
homeless, hungry and disoriented - deprived of the necessities of
life because they are mentally incapable of obtaining or receiving
116.
117.

Id.
Lamb, supra note 9, at 900; see also supra notes 33-37 and accompanying

text.

118. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text; see generally M. TEST, ComMUNITY SUPPORT PROGRAMS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 347 (A. Bellach ed. 1984); Keisler,
Mental Hospitals & Alternative Care, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 349 (1982).
119. See M. TEST, supra note 118; Keisler, supra note 114.
120. City and County of San Francisco,57 Cal. App. 3d at 50, 128 Cal. Rptr. at
716; see also County of Los Angeles v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. 3d
391, 401, 179, 637 P.2d 681, 687, 179 Cal. Rptr. 214, 220 (1981) (quoting Industry
Comm'n of Ohio v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40, 193 N.E. 620 (1934)); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. at 254, 264-265 (1970); Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 20809, 695 P.2d 695, 700-701, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403-404.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.

The purpose of California's welfare laws is to make recipients
more self-sufficient. Without mental health care being provided by
an aggressive program in all counties, mentally disabled indigents
will not become self-sufficient. Their basic life needs will not be met,
because they are unable to seek or keep receiving assistance without
treatment for their mental illness.
A county-provided community-based health care system for indigents supports the state goal of treatment in the community and provides the most effective method of treatment while allowing the mentally ill to maintain more of their freedom.
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